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ADOPTION,	WELFARE	AND	THE	PROCREATIVE	ONE-NIGHT	STAND THE	full	impact	of	the	welfare	focus	in	the	Adoption	and	Children	Act	2002	has	yet	to	be	realised.	In	Re	C	(a	child)	(adoption:	duty	of	local	authority)	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	1206,	[2007]	3	F.C.R.	659,	the	Court	of	Appeal	took	a	distinctly	individualistic	view	of	the	issue.	In	that	case,	 34	The	Cambridge	Law	Journal	[2008]	 19-year-old	M	became	pregnant	with	E	after	a	‘‘one-night	stand’’	with	F.	She	told	neither	F	nor	her	own	parents	and	wanted	E	to	be	adopted.	The	local	authority	sought	judicial	guidance	on	whether	they	should	approach	E’s	extended	family	with	a	view	to	placing	her	with	them,	despite	M’s	objections.	The	judge	held	them	to	be	under	a	duty	to	obtain	as	much	information	about	the	family	as	possible,	including	F	and	his	family	if	he	could	be	identified.	M	appealed,	by	which	time	the	maternal	grandparents	were	aware	of	E’s	birth	due	to	a	local	authority	error.	They	offered	assistance	but	took	no	part	in	the	proceedings.	The	Court	of	Appeal,	led	by	Arden	L.J.,	found	no	duty	to	make	enquiries	that	did	not	‘‘genuinely	further	the	prospect	of	finding	a	long-term	carer...without	delay’’	(at	[3]),	and	neither	F	nor	 the	grandparents	were	considered	to	be	likely	carers.	Arden	L.J.	admitted	that	the	paramountcy	principle	in	section	1	of	the	2002	Act	embraced	E’s	interest	in	retaining	her	identity,	and	required	the	court	to	consider	the	effect	of	her	ceasing	to	be	a	member	of	the	birth	family	and	her	relationships	with	‘‘relatives’’.	Both	the	grandparents	and	F	were	considered	‘‘relatives’’,	despite	F’s	ignorance	of	E’s	birth,	but	that	alone	did	not	generate	an	obligation	to	approach	them.	The	birth	family	were	not	prioritised	by	virtue	of	their	status,	and	the	only	aspect	of	welfare	emphasised	by	Parliament	was	preventing	delay:	s.	1(3)	of	the	Act.	Thus,	there	could	be	no	absolute	duty	to	make	the	enquiries.	Arden	L.J.	also	denied	the	existence	of	an	‘‘expectation	of	disclosure’’	(at	[23]).	While	disclosure	would	be	in	the	child’s	interests	in	many	cases,	in	‘‘exceptional	situations’’	such	as	this	it	was	appropriate	for	relatives,	including	a	father,	to	remain	ignorant	of	a	child’s	birth	at	the	time	of	adoption.	This,	she	opined,	was	consistent	with	the	fact	that	F’s	consent	was	not	required	for	the	 adoption	due	to	his	lack	of	parental	responsibility.	The	Court	considered	this	to	be	compatible	with	Article	8	of	the	 European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	since	F	did	not	have	‘‘family	life’’	with	E,	having	neither	lived	with	M	nor	expressed	commitment	to	E.	Despite	his	ignorance	of	E’s	existence,	which	made	it	impossible	to	express	such	commitment,	it	was	held	that	preventing	F	from	obtaining	the	possibility	of	a	right	with	regard	to	E	did	not	violate	Article	8.	There	was	therefore	no	need	for	a	justification	under	Article	8(2).	Arden	L.J.	also	noted	that	the	Article	8	right	to	receive	information	relating	to	one’s	identity	was	within	the	state’s	margin	of	appreciation	following	Odie`vre	v.	France	([2003]	1	F.C.R.	621).	The	only	such	right	provided	under	the	2002	Act	related	to	the	adoption	file,	so	no	informational	right	would	justify	the	enquiries.	Further,	any	benefit	that	E	would	eventually	derive	from	information	about	her	origins	was	secondary	to,	and	would	actually	delay,	the	objective	of	finding	a	long-term	home.	The	Court	held	that	the	existence	of	a	right	 Downloaded	from	https://www.cambridge.org/core.	The	Librarian-Seeley	Historical	Library,	on	17	Apr	2019	at	15:27:05,	subject	to	the	Cambridge	Core	terms	of	use,	available	at	https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197308000287	 C.L.J.	Case	and	Comment	35	 for	E	to	be	raised	by	F	could	be	determined	only	when	a	final	adoption	order	was	made,	and	a	potential	right	could	not	require	disclosure	at	this	stage.	By	contrast,	the	grandparents	were	said	to	have	‘‘family	life’’	automatically	following	Marckx	v.	Belgium	((1979)	2	E.H.R.R.	330),	although	their	rights	would	not	be	violated	if	E’s	welfare	required	a	non-disclosure	order.	 Arden	L.J.	then	considered	the	exercise	of	the	court’s	discretion	to	inform	the	extended	family	in	the	absence	of	a	duty.	The	over-arching	consideration	was	the	welfare	of	the	child	as	an	individual.	Where	a	child	had	never	lived	with	the	birth	family,	the	tie	was	overtaken	by	the	need	to	find	a	permanent	home.	The	grandparents’	communications	were	insufficient	to	delay	E’s	placement	for	adoption,	especially	since	they	had	not	made	an	application	to	provide	care.	Moreover,	four-	month-old	E	had	formed	bonds	with	her	foster	parents.	Finally,	Arden	L.J.	held	that	there	was	‘‘no	basis	for	supposing	that	[F]	could	provide	a	home	for	E’’,	and	that	possibility	was	‘‘too	intangible’’	to	delay	a	placement	(at	[48]).	Thorpe	L.J.	recognised	the	‘‘good	social	policy	reasons	for	accepting	the	option	of	a	private	birth’’,	which	the	Court	risked	precluding	if	it	dismissed	the	appeal	(at	[82]).	They	therefore	ordered	the	local	authority	not	to	take	any	steps	to	identify	F	or	inform	him	about	E,	or	to	assess	the	grandparents	as	prospective	carers.	 Arden	L.J.’s	admission	that	disclosure	would	be	appropriate	in	many	cases	is	admirable.	However,	while	she	viewed	this	case	as	exceptional,	it	might	have	been	a	typical	example	of	a	mother	keeping	a	pregnancy	secret	because	she	wants	nothing	more	to	do	with	the	father,	
irrespective	of	the	child’s	interests.	Further,	it	is	doubtful	that	the	lack	of	a	consent	requirement	justifies	denying	a	father	without	parental	responsibility	knowledge	of	his	child’s	existence	and	adoption.	 At	the	heart	of	this	case	lies	the	power	differential	between	birth	mothers	and	fathers	without	parental	responsibility.	Although	the	Court	emphasised	the	‘‘child-centred’’	rather	than	‘‘mother-centred’’	nature	of	the	2002	Act	(at	[15]),	the	mother’s	automatic	family	life	with	the	child	collapses	this	distinction	somewhat.	The	narrow	view	of	welfare	arguably	prioritised	M’s	interests	rather	than	E’s,	and	the	Court	was	dismissive	about	the	existence	of	E	and	F’s	Article	8	rights,	let	alone	the	need	to	justify	their	infringement.	M	was	free	to	demand	child	support	from	F,	put	E	up	for	adoption,	or	do	anything	in	between,	while	F	was	powerless.	Whether	or	not	it	is	justified	(the	debate	over	biological	and	social	parenthood	continues),	this	state	of	affairs	is	undeniably	controversial.	The	case	also	illustrates	that	it	can	be	easier	for	maternal	grandparents	to	demonstrate	family	life	with	a	child	than	it	is	for	an	unmarried	father.	While	this	is	sometimes	 acceptable,	it	represents	an	undesirable	assumption	to	make	about	the	reality	of	family	life.	 Some	commentators	will	certainly	be	surprised	at	the	results	produced	when	courts	have	a	wide	discretion	to	interpret	‘‘welfare’’,	even	in	the	era	of	Article	8.	 BRIAN	SLOAN	 	
